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1.   Historiographical Context 
After twenty-odd years of lively discourse the Great Divergence Debate should be credited with 
establishing a view among economic historians that the organic economy of Imperial China may 
be represented as being more economically and technologically advanced in pre-industrial times, 
than the cluster of national economies located within the frontiers of modern Western Europe. 
Only late in the day did that interconnected group of countries evolve to become scientifically, 
technically, economically and geopolitically the most developed and powerful in the world.1  
 
Thus, the recent debate has been concentrated on the meta question of when, how and why the 
Western economies led by Britain, became clearly more efficient than the economy of Imperial 
China.2 Since these two regions of Eurasia had remained virtually disconnected for centuries 
preceding this discontinuity, narratives in modern global history could include a short chapter on 
their limited inter-connexions and remain concentrated on two contrasting trajectories for long-
run economic growth.3  
 
The core question to debate is why one historical trajectory led to the observed and more rapid 
development of western economies, while for the past three or four centuries the other has 
exhibited pronounced retardation and relative decline. Either way, and within a world economy of 
increasingly extensive and intensive geopolitical and economic connexions (including commerce 
and competition between Europe and Asia) the relative position of China deteriorated. That 
economy’s retardation continues to be explained with reference to the maintenance of a traditional 
political system for the governance of a vast territorial empire, archaic institutions, conservative 
 
1 Pomeranz, ‘Without Coal’. 
2 Daly, Historians Debate. 
3 Vries, State. 
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beliefs and backward technology, which for centuries placed China’s organic economy upon a 
trajectory leading to avoidable stasis and a prolonged widening of divergence with the West.4  
 
The core of the modern revisionist rejection of this view (which provoked a vigorous counter 
attack) can be read in the writings of the California School of Historical Sociology. The School has 
formulated, fortified and defended a now famous thesis that for several centuries before the French 
and Industrial Revolutions, the economies of Western Europe and China operated in ways that 
look similar. Supporters of ‘surprising resemblances’ maintain that the supposedly superior and 
more efficient political systems, cultural beliefs, economic institutions and technologies of Western 
European nations had not generated anything approximating to clear differentials in the 
productivities of labour and standards of living for their populations that are the hallmarks of more 
advanced and progressive economic systems.5  
 
The unsettled dispute over a chronology for contrasts in per capita levels of welfare provided by 
the Chinese economy for its population compared to European standards forms an essential 
preface to any serious discourse about divergence that aspires to the recognized as persuasive.6 If 
acceptable statistical evidence could be assembled, dated and compared the respective historical 
trajectories for the national economies of Western Europe and China could be located and 
compared across space and through time. Macro-economic indices could be deployed to ‘test’ the 
plausibility of the basic revisionist arguments deployed by the California School to undermine 
Eurocentred/Weberian views that divergence had occurred because the framework of cultural 
beliefs and institutions surrounding production in Imperial China had evolved historically to 
support a trajectory for long-run economic progress that could be represented as negative for the 
structural changes and innovations leading to modern industrial market economies.7  
 
Western economists and economic historians have not been slow to respond to the challenge to 
provide both theoretically plausible reasons as well as statistical evidence to undermine the critique 
that their perceptions of late Imperial China are superficial and Eurocentric. Predictably they have 
subjected core theses of the California School to the heavy artillery of standard tests deployed by 
economists and economic historians to quantify rates of growth and relative levels of welfare 
provided by national economies for their citizens.8  
 
4 O’Brien, Economies. 
5 Parthasarathi and Pomeranz, ‘Debate’.  
6 Roy and Riello, Global Economic History. 
7 Vries, State Economy. 
8 Van Zanden and Ma, ‘Maddison’. 
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This programme of historical research continues to uncover statistical evidence that has been 
heuristic to contemplate, compare and elaborate upon for economic historians of Imperial China 
and Western Europe. It has matured into a major example of the paradigm established decades 
ago for the study of national economic histories, empirical economics and the application of 
comparative methods for global histories of long-term economic growth by a Nobel Prize winner 
in Economics, Simon Kuznets.9  
 
The Kuznets’ paradigm for the study of national and comparative trends in the long run economic 
growth of nations explicitly recommends a conceptual framework (national accounts) and a 
methodology for quantification which has involved generations of economists and economic 
historians in the collection and calibration of data that could be validated as sufficiently reliable 
for the construction of a series of estimates for GDP’s of Western economies. These disciplined 
endeavours have involved: 
 
1. The measurement of the net annual values of outputs emanating from the primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors of national economies. 
2. The aggregation of these outputs into a series of annual estimates of gross domestic 
products available to be divided by accessible and more or less secure statistics for 
national/imperial populations in order to measure trends and cycles in GDP per capita. 
3. The construction of price indices and purchasing power parity rates of exchange 
in order to convert estimates for GDP from current into constant prices and an appropriate 
numeraire to facilitate: 
(a) The measurement of trends, and (if possible) cycles in growth over time; 
(b) Cross-country comparisons that quantify the relative capacities of 
national/imperial economies to supply commodities and services for their populations and 
revenues for their states over selected periods in history.10  
 
The plausibility of the results flowing from this productive paradigm for historical research 
depends upon: the availability, accessibility, volume and quality of statistical evidence as well as the 
methods and concepts adopted by scholars who have been engaged with the construction of 
indices designed to measure and compare China with Western Europe. For example, relative levels 
of GDP per capita, real wage rates and the family incomes for Chinese peasants and landless 
 
9 Kuznets, Growth Rate; Fogel, Political Arithmetic; and Floud, Britain and Europe. 
10 Kuznets, Growth Rate; and his Growth of Nations. 
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workers compared with incomes derivable from wages payable to unskilled labour employed in 
the construction industries of European towns.11 At present it looks as if this hard won and 
transparent body of statistical evidence has undermined the thesis of the California School that 
contrasts in productivity and welfare between the economies of late Imperial China and Western 
Europe had not occurred before the late 18th century, and divergence cannot be explained with 
reference to any longer term contrasts with institutions for the management of Imperial China’s 
organic economy.12  
 
Chronology remains central to the revisionist argument that Europeans and Chinese lived and 
worked in a world of surprising resemblances until late in the eighteenth century because if it could 
be supported by statistical evidence, then the defects (posited by ‘Weberians’) in the culture, 
institutions and above all, in the constitution of the state established and maintained over many 
centuries for the management of a very large imperial economy are no longer tenable. 13 
Furthermore, this Sinocentred chronology supporting an analysis that Europe’s convergence 
towards an ultimate divergence from China also becomes more logical to represent as the outcome 
flowing from a range of contingent factors. They included: natural endowments of a new and 
eventually highly significant source of energy, namely coal; the discovery and gradual exploitation 
of a massive bounty of natural resources in the Americas; and the unintended consequences of 
interstate rivalry, mercantilist competition and protracted interludes of warfare that emanated from 
Europe’s failure to construct and sustain an hegemonic state to rule and regulate the fragmented 
economy of that sub-continent.14  
 
A brigade of distinguished scholars with credentials in European economic history aided and 
abetted by a platoon of economists educated at western universities have continued to maintain 
that their representations and calibrations of data sets for Imperial China demonstrate that 
divergence occurred much earlier than the eighteenth century. 15  We find, however, that the 
statistics utilized by both sides in this debate will not wash.16 As most historians in touch with the 
primary sources utilized for macro-economic measurement have recognized (even for European 
economies with archives of official data available for their construction) indices that are reliable 
enough to support plausible conjectures for rates and relative levels of economic development 
 
11 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Debate’. 
12 Berg, Writing the History. 
13 Goldstone, Why Europe; van Zanden and Ma, ‘Maddison’. 
14 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and Beyond Divergence; and van Halte, ‘Escaping the Great Divergence’. 
15 Van Zanden and Ma, ‘Maddison’. 
16 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Debate’; ‘Statistical Foundations’; and ‘GDP per Capita’. 
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have been difficult to construct. On close examination they have often turned out to be less than 
durable.17 For Imperial China, even the most basic evidence required for the construction of 
plausible conjectures for a total population, areas of land cultivated and cropped, nominal daily 
wage rates, outputs of major crops and industrial commodities, the volumes of exports, imports 
and internal trade expressed in standardized or standardisable moneys of account are simply not 
available.18  
 
Our investigations into the data utilized by both sides in the Divergence Debate has reluctantly 
concluded that the application of the Kuznetsian paradigm for historical research designed to 
locate the conjuncture in premodern history when divergence between Imperial China and 
Western Europe emerged, persisted and widened is not viable. As Karl Popper might say for this 
particular debate, the paradigm is degenerate. Its status approximates to conceptual art in the 
history of art and as such is convincing only to those who claim the impressions conveyed by their 
constructed numbers are historical ‘facts’ that approximate to the explicanda required for analytical 
narratives of long-run growth.19  
 
 
2.   Primary and Secondary Sources for Kuznetsian Economic Histories of Imperial 
China 
Undaunted by the paucity and quality of primary sources as well as the complexities involved in 
the construction of purchasing power parity rates of exchange for historical comparisons across 
continents, our colleague Stephen Broadberry with two Chinese co-authors (Hanhui GUAN and 
David Daokui LI) have ventured to publish a series of estimates for the GDP per capita for 
Imperial China from the Song to the Qing Dynasties – 980 to 1850. For purposes of comparison 
with western economies they have converted the series into 1990 international dollars.20 
 
We applaud their ambition and welcome the opportunity to engage in a discussion with them on 
the evidential basis for an extension of the Kuznetsian paradigm for historical national accounting, 
to include Asian economies in general and to provide statistics for a chronology and explicanda 
that could reconfigure the unsettled debate on the Great Divergence between Imperial China and 
Europe in particular.21  
 
17 Speich, ‘Global Abstraction’; Jerven, ‘Unlevel Playing Field’; Boldizzioni and Hudson, Handbook. 
18 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Maddison Was Wrong’; Hatcher and Stephenson, Unreal Wages. 
19 Vries, State Economy. 
20 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’. 
21 Goldstone, ‘Data and Dating’. 
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Now that the results of a Kuznetsian endeavour by Broadberry, Guan and Li (hereafter BGL) have 
been published and prefaced by an understatement that the data available for the vast and complex 
economy of Imperial China is ‘not as abundant as British data’ we decided to elaborate and update 
the view we had formed, circulated in working papers and published as articles in three journals.22 
Briefly it stated our view was written to defend a traditional historiography which maintained that 
the primary statistical sources available for the construction of estimates of GDP per capita for 
Imperial China (even for so-called ‘normal’ years of Ming and Qing rule) are not sufficient in 
quantity, scope or quality to support claims for a macro-economic framework for the analysis of 
the empire’s long-run development from 1400-1840.23  
 
Our response to BGL’s laudable endeavour would probably not, moreover, surprise political 
historians who are familiar with the complexities of governing empires of the size and geographical 
diversity of Ming and even more of Qing China.24 Historians of pre-modern China recognize 
Chinese dynasties reigned rather than ruled over their empires. They lacked the fiscal resources, 
administrative capacities and access to technologies to govern such extensive and diverse areas of 
territory and the ethnically heterogeneous populations living within the vulnerable frontiers of 
their empires.25 The statistical information that the State managed to collect could only have 
covered confined regions and localities of the polity. Data were only acquired sporadically. 
Statistical information available to China’s imperial regimes must have been subject to more 
significant margins of error than the data acquired by the altogether smaller and more governable 
polities of western Europe.26 
 
Nevertheless, BGL consulted an impressive bibliography of modern secondary literature on the 
economic history of Imperial China (including printed and edited collections of primary sources) 
published in Chinese and English over the last 60 years. The authors have somehow managed to 
recover and calibrate a sufficient volume of statistical data to publish estimates that prima facie 
appear to satisfy the core prescription of the Kuznetsian paradigm for writing economic histories 
based upon national accounts: to ‘quantify the quantifiable.’27  
 
 
22 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Debate’; Statistical Foundations’; ‘GDP per Capita’; and ‘Maddison Was Wrong’. 
23 Eckstein, Economic Trends; Feuerwerker, ‘Presidential Address’. 
24 Emigh, et al., Antecedents. 
25 Deng, Premodern Chinese Economy; Jones, Growth Recurring; Elvin, Pattern; Fairbank and Liu, Cambridge History. 
26 Emigh, et al., Antecedents; Yun-Casallila and O’Brien, Fiscal States; von Glahn, Economic History. 
27 Kuznets, Growth of Nations, p. 16. 
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Explicitly and implicitly BGL have also endeavoured to reassure fastidious historians that Asia like 
early modern Europe was ‘more literate and numerate than is often thought and left behind a 
wealth of data in documents.’28 Unfortunately relative levels of literacy and numeracy for Ming and 
Qing China compared to Western Europe have not and probably cannot be measured.29 While the 
‘wealth of data’ included in the authors list of ‘European documents’ and compared to a list of 
‘Chinese’ data sources do not equate to a procedure for the validation of the type and quality of 
statistical evidence that they used for the construction of a historical sequences of macro-economic 
estimates for domestic production.30 We retain our view that the primary sources available for 
Ming and Qing China do not allow for the construction of estimates that could refer to or represent 
either rates or relative levels of growth for the Imperial economy as a whole.31  
 
We recognize that BGL made a real effort to consult the current bibliography of published 
secondary and printed primary literature that might contain statistical evidence for the compilation 
of historical accounts for Imperial China. We will, however, suggest that their validation of that 
evidence does not (as we read their paper) seem to have been sufficiently critical. For example, 
merely listing sources that contain statistics is not a procedure for verification. Historians of 
Imperial China long been aware that most documents collected for the governance of the empire 
were systematically destroyed with each and every change of dynastic regime after its official 
history had been written by ‘historians’ employed in the service of a successor regime seeking 
legitimacy for a mandate to rule China. Thus, however efficiently or inefficiently official statistical 
information may have been gathered in order to administer policies for the empire the records for 
dynasties, apart from records for the Qing regime were to repeat destroyed.32  
 
Furthermore, records that fortunately survived are unlikely to be either imperial in scope or to 
include statistics that might serve as proxies for the ‘plausible conjectures’ that historians could 
recognize as viable enough for the calibration of evidence required to compile imperial accounts 
for annual outputs emanating from primary, secondary and tertiary forms of domestic production 
in current and constant prices that could be converted into conceptually valid values denominated 
 
28 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, p. 957. 
29 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Standards of Living’. 
30 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, pp 959-62. 
31 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Debate’; ‘Statistical Foundations’; ‘GDP per Capita’; and ‘Maddison Was Wrong’. 
32 Zan and Deng, ‘Micro Foundations’. 
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in some globally accepted currency or commodity that represents their purchasing power parity 
values on markets for national currencies in pre-modern times.33  
 
Several features of the imperial state and the economy help to explain the paucity of historical 
statistics that are available for Imperial China.34 Sooner or later dynastic regimes confronted the 
omnipresent political and technological constraints of ruling over and taxing an extensive territorial 
and ecologically varied empire with long and vulnerable frontiers containing populations that were 
ethnically and culturally diverse. Contexts of time, place and political prudence confined their role 
in the management of a polity of interrelated but less than integrated local economies dominated 
by household units for the organization of production, to relatively low rates of fiscal extraction 
and expenditure. 35  Taxation accompanied by bouts of predation were normally sufficient to 
maintain regime stability, internal order, external security and social relief from disasters. While 
demands on the state for higher and more active levels of involvement in the economic affairs of 
the empire remained at tolerable levels of political pressure from a population growing slowly. 
Incentives and pressures on the imperial state to acquire statistical information about China’s 
economy and society were altogether weaker than those operating among the mercantilist and 
warring states of Western Europe.36  
 
Various historians of Imperial China do not regard the volume, range and quality of statistical 
records to be remotely comparable to those available to their colleagues who specialize on the 
polities of medieval and early modern Europe.37 Furthermore, a survey of the bibliography of 
books and articles published in recent decades on the economic history of the Chinese empire will, 
we also suggest, expose the understandable frustrations of their colleagues with ambitions to write 
modern Kuznetsian-style economic histories of the empire.38 After all they are now writing at a 
time of accelerated globalization when China (and India) are regaining their historical status as 
advanced economies. BGL’s ambition has, moreover, almost certainly been fuelled by an 
expectation that as a ‘way of knowing’ Kuznetsian analysis is superior to more traditional methods 
on display in the Cambridge and other histories of China (and India).39  
 
33 Vide our debate with van Zanden and Ma, ‘Maddison’ versus Deng and O’Brien, ‘Statistical Foundations’, and 
‘GDP per Capita’. 
34 Wong, China Transformed; Li, ‘Economic History’.  
35 Yun-Casallila and O’Brien, Fiscal State; Liu, ‘Vision’. 
36 Deng, Political Economy, Pt 1; Brook, Chinese State; Dincecco and Onorato, From Warfare to Wealth. 
37 Ge, et al., ‘Farmland Resources’, Zhong, ‘Quantitative Estimates’; Peng, ‘Long-term Changes’; Peng, ‘Prices’; Yang, 
‘Tang Records’; Shi and Ma, ‘Yield per Mu’; Wang, ‘Summary’; Liu, ‘Maddison’; Liu, Total GDP; Wei, ‘Reality and 
Fairy Tale’; Ni, ‘China’s Total GDP’. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Fairbank and Liu, Cambridge History; Raychauduri, et al., Cambridge History. 
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BGL were certainly aware of the scale, scope and quality of the data at their disposal and they have 
dealt with the problem in three distinct ways. First, they have attempted to reassure their readers 
about a ‘wealth of data’ available in primary sources.40 Secondly, they adopted the margins of error 
technique deployed by the distinguished Harvard economist and sinologist Dwight Perkins who 
attempted to produce an acceptable series of statistics for the empire’s population and agricultural 
output fifty years ago.41 Thirdly, in emulating the Perkins’ example three scholars (with recognized 
distinctions in disciplines other than Chinese history) have awarded their own ‘reliability grades’ to 
statistics that they represent as quantified estimates for domestic, primary, secondary and tertiary 
production for benchmarked but ‘normal’ years of Chinese imperial history under the Northern 
Song, Ming and Qing dynasties. Their numbers are expressed in current and constant prices as 
well as 1990 international dollars, decade by decade, from 980-1850. The grades they awarded 
themselves range from A (‘firm figures’) to D (‘conjectures’) are derived from: ‘error margins’ (pace 
Perkins) and ‘comparisons with alternative series by other authors and by taking account of 
fluctuations in the underlying data.’ 42  This procedure of ‘subjective’ data validation has not, 
however, been based on close engagement with an entirely limited range of official primary sources 
that refer to the empire as a whole. 
 
In general, the foundational evidence for their estimates has been derived in large part from a 
historiography of secondary literature (books and articles) published by professional economic 
historians of Imperial China. In search for statistics that referred to the empire, Chinese historians 
too have also grappled as best they could with a restricted volume of unreliable official data for 
macro-economic measurement. 43  Much of this secondary literature (referred to by BGL as 
‘credible’ and which contains statistical evidence) is based upon a body of unofficial publications 
(gazettes and private histories) that tend to be unambiguously provincial, prefectural, county and 
even more local and spatial in their focus. It is rarely the product of properly designed and executed 
local surveys. According to Zhai’s unpublished research the statistics in these sources often consist 
of numbers copied repeatedly from reports written from time to time by Mandarins to inform the 
central government that economic conditions in more or less remote parts of a rapidly expanding 
territorial Qing empire are satisfactory.44  
 
40 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, p. 957. 
41 Perkins, Agricultural Development; Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, pp. 957, 979-81. 
42 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, pp. 979-8 and appendices published online, pp. 50-62 
43 The first published attempt was made by Chung-li Chang, an American trained economist, in his study of China’s 
gentry class; see Chang, Chinese Gentry. His bold, but primitive, methods have inspired many works including those by 
Perkins, Agricultural Development and Zhao, et al., Grain Yield. 
44 Zhai, ‘Economic Performance’. 
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To sum up: It is our perception that in an endeavour to find quantitative evidence that might 
conceivably refer to Imperial China as a single macro-economic unit BGL confronted insoluble 
problems of validating the nature and quality of data that they utilized. They have also found it 
necessary to make claims for statistics that are geographically confined in reference but have been 
aggregated and refined into macro-economic statistical evidence that purports to refer to the vast 
complex and diverse economy of Imperial China. 
 
In order to gain acceptance for their calibrations of this evidence they have conceded that ‘some 
data from official historical literature suffers from inaccuracies and biases’.45 The ways and degrees 
that is the case is not, however, analysed. Instead they add a confident assertion that ‘Chinese 
economic historians have drawn upon other (again unspecified) sources to publish adjusted data.’ 
We do appreciate that a major feature of Kuznetsian economic histories consists of statistical 
evidence derived from refinements to imperfect primary sources until a consensus emerges around 
a range of ‘plausible conjectures.’ Nevertheless, along with most other students of Imperial China, 
we are not convinced that the state and status of the secondary literature published over the past 
sixty years includes anything like the range of canonical publications required for the construction 
of a plausible set of benchmarked estimates aggregated to represent acceptable conjectures for 
trends and levels in the empire’s GDP from 980-1850. In his historiographical survey of the field 
Li Bozhong states that ‘We don’t really know what the economy looks like as a whole.’ 46 Li resists 
the temptation to generate imperial national accounting for China. 
 
As we read it the secondary literature that BGL rely upon for statistical evidence for their estimates 
will not stand up to examination for reasons we elaborate upon in detail in sections 3 to 5 above. 
Meanwhile we conclude this section with an illustrative genealogy of Chinese and Western scholars 
who have also published macro-economic statistics (both with and without qualification) that 
purport to refer to an Imperial Economy (Figure 1). 
  
 
45 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, p. 961. 
46 Li, ‘Economic History in China’, p. 304. Also, see Ge, et al., ‘Farmland Resources’, Zhong, ‘Quantitative Estimates’; 
Peng, ‘Long-term Changes’; Peng, ‘Prices’; Yang, ‘Tang Records’; Shi and Ma, ‘Yield per Mu’; Wang, ‘Summary’; Liu, 
‘Maddison’; Liu, Total GDP; Wei, ‘Reality and Fairy Tale’. 
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Sources (by date of publication): Kuznets, National Income; Buck, Land Utilization; Clark, Economic Progress; Ou,47 ‘New 
Estimate’; Ou, National Income; Wu, China’s National Income; Liu, China’s National Income; Liu, ‘Structural Changes’; Liu 
and Yeh, ‘Preliminary Estimate’; Chang,48 Chinese Gentry; Perkins, Agricultural Development; Liang, Dynastic Data; Xu and 
Wu, Capitalist Development; Chen, Market Mechanisms; Wang, ‘Rice Prices’; Zhao, et al., Grain Yield; Liu and Wang Market 
Development; Li, Agricultural Development; Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance; Lee and Wang, ‘Malthusian Models’; 
Guo, ‘Food Production’; Pomeranz, Great Divergence; Ge, Demographic History; Shiue and Keller, ‘Markets in China’; 
Allen, ‘Agricultural productivity’; Wu, Quantitative Issues; Liu, Chinese Market Economy; Allen, et al., ‘Wages’; Liu, China’s 
Total GDP; Guan and Li, ‘China’s GDP’; Liu, GDP and Economic Growth; Shi, Development and Underdevelopment; Shi, 




47 Pao-San Ou is also known as ‘Wu Baosan’ in Mandarin. 
48 Chung-li Chang is also known as ‘Zhang Zhongli’ in Mandarin. 
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Prima facie, there are two genealogies that exemplify quantitative approaches to the economic 
history of Imperial China. The first can be ascribed to the enduring influence of Simon Kuznets’ 
who invented historical national accounting in the 1940’s. The second originated with John Buck, 
the American agro-economist who in the 1920’s carried out the first scientific survey of China’s 
farming sector and produced hard data. Unfortunately, the methods pioneered by Buck have been 
less influential than the approach favoured by ‘Kuznetsians’. Kuznets himself never studied China. 
His followers – namely Colin Clark, Pao-san Ou (or Wu Baosan), Ta-chung Liu, Kung-chia Yen, 
Angus Maddison and BGL - have not shared his respect for the need to comprehend and validate 
data from reliable primary and secondary sources for the measurement of GDP. Instead, they have 
circumvented an insurmountable problem by reconstructing and refining each other’s educated 
guesses and subjective impressions into ambiguous and misleading proxies for the statistics 
required for the measurement (and analysis) of China’s production, incomes and consumption.  
 
Three examples of this influential but egregious tendency found in publications by Chung-li Chang 
(or ‘Zhang Zhongli’, according to the Mandarin spelling) are summarised in this paper and 
elaboration in detail in appendices to this paper. Chang manufactured a database of macro-
economic statistics that purports to refer to the Empire as a whole from a scattered chronology of 
numbers and anecdotal evidence that he found in eighty-three local gazettes. He refers to just 4% 
of the ecologically diverse and almost certainly unrepresentative counties included in the Qing 
empire. Needless to say Chang’s ‘numbers’ are open to criticism. Another more example is Guo 
Songyi who cited six sporadic observations of farm outputs for benchmark years for the Ming 
Period (1368-1644). Guo’s data refer to the Lake Tai Region which included 8 prefectures 
governing 51 counties.49 He went on to create another set of benchmarks that were also based on 
six sporadic observations, for the Hu-Guang region that included 16 prefectures. 50  Guo’s 
calibrations include figures for double cropping and New World crops (maize and sweet potatoes) 
as well as figures based on the assumption that rent amounted to 50% of gross output. He asserts 
that average China-wide yield levels per mu rose from 240 catties to 256 catties, and to 319 catties 
for the early Ming, late Ming and late Qing, respectively. His assumption about rents is incorrect. 
In the Ming-Qing period, a fixed rent based on the first crop (main crop) was widespread. 
Furthermore, Guo’s benchmark years make no allowance for crop failures that probably occurred 
 
49 Guo, ‘Food Production’; Deng and O’Brien, ‘Nutritional Standards’, p. 241. 
50 Guo, ‘Food Production’. 
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every third year.51 Our third example is the book published in both English and Chinese by Shi 
Zhihong in 2017 which we examine in detail in our working paper Section 4. 
 
 
3.   Areas of Cultivated Land Allocated to the Production of Grains in Ming-Qing China 
Section 3 is devoted to an altogether more detailed critique of the methods, sources and 
assumptions adopted by BGL for the estimation of trends in the nominal values, volumes and 
relative levels of grain output produced by the agricultural sector of the Imperial economy 1400-
1840. We have set aside the period 980-1400 and concentrated on their estimates for grains. Rice, 
wheat, barley, millet, corn, potatoes and sorghum constitute roughly half of their estimate for net 
value added in current prices of Imperial China’s gross domestic production for 1840. 
Furthermore, we also observe that the range of ostensibly hard statistics cited by BGL as ‘firm’ or 
‘good’ figures for net values added for cash crops and other primary products are derived as mark-
ups at a constant ratio of 20% on their ostensibly measured output for grains. A similar resort to 
mark-ups on figures designated as derivable from grain output also generated estimates for 
components of BGL’s estimates for net values added of the industrial and service sectors for 1840. 
 
BGL recognized that the ‘groundwork for this mode of estimation was laid by Perkins who drew 
upon the work of Chinese and Japanese scholars to derive ‘adjustment coefficients’ applied to 
official but highly imperfect primary sources for Ming and Qing China.’52 They did not mention 
that Perkins published two sets of estimates calibrated with different data to measure trends and 
levels of grain output for Imperial China. One was based his selection of estimates for the size of 
the empire’s population to which Perkins attached ‘subjective margins of error’ which he 
multiplied by a constant of 527 catties of (unhusked) rice per capita. He offered both numbers as 
a transparent and plausible way to construct a long run series of estimates that might conceivably 
represent trends in the volume of grains produced by the empire’s agricultural sector. Perkins 
obtained his ‘impressions of grain output per capita’ from data published by Buck and several other 
historians. He noted their estimates seldom fell below 360-480 catties or rose above 700 catties.’53 
Alex Eckstein, another economist with credentials as a sinologist, considered the construction of 
such estimates to be impossible.54 Perkins conveyed commendable hesitations about the whole 
exercise of multiplying contested data for China’s total population by a constant volume of rice 
 
51 For the frequency, scale and scope of natural disasters, see Fairbank and Liu, China, vol. 11, pt. 2, p. 7; Perkins, 
Agricultural Development, p. 172; also Buck, Atlas, pp. 30–1. 
52 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, pp. 965-69. 
53 Perkins, Agricultural Development, pp. 308-10. 
54 Eckstein, Economic Trends. 
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equivalents representing educated but subjective and configured impressions of a modal but 
unchanging level of per capita consumption production of grains for 1368-1850. Transparency does 
little, however, to alleviate scepticism towards this way measuring trends in the production of food 
grains. It simply begs the question? 
 
For their purposes BGL sensibly decided to concentrate on an alternative and complementary 
sequence of exercises (also initiated by Perkins) to construct estimates of the area of Imperial 
China’s land cultivated with food grains multiplied by estimates of averaged annual yields for food 
grains converted to rice equivalents. 55  Unfortunately, neither the Ming nor the Qing state 
conducted comprehensive systematic cadastral surveys required to measure the empire’s cultivated 
area of farmed land – 80% of which, according to Perkins, was sown with food grains – principally 
under rice and/or wheat. The only potentially relevant data available to estimate the area of 
Imperial China’s land cultivated with grains are for farmland liable to taxation. Although land-
owners had a legal incentive to register their property rights, fiscal and agrarian historians have 
recognized that a significant but virtually unmeasurable share of the empire’s cultivated area legally 
and illegally avoided and/or evaded taxation. Furthermore, and apart from the aforementioned 
absence of empire-wide cadastral surveys, in 1712 by decree, the Qing emperor capped the total 
amount of the land tax to be collected at a permanently fixed sum of 30 million taels per annum. 
56 This decree effectively diminished any need for the state to systematically and regularly measure 
the area of cultivated land liable for taxation at a time when the Empire’s population and extensive 
margin of cultivated land potentially available for taxation was increasing rapidly.57 
 
In line with Perkins and other scholars BGL proceeded to ‘adjust’ records for ‘taxed units’ of land 
in order to estimate the area of taxed land sown with grains.58 In doing so they recognized another 
and altogether ‘a more serious worry’ – namely, the lack of a consistent standard for the 
measurement of areas of land. The Chinese mu which varied (and historians suggest varied 
significantly) ‘between regions and over time’. 59  Their ad hoc solution to this familiar and 
significant problem for Chinese agrarian history is to assure readers that ‘much effort has been 
devoted to documenting this variation’ and to work in terms of Perkins’ solution published (with 
 
55 Perkins, Agricultural Development. 
56 Zhao, History of the Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, p. 8853. 
57 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 8883.  
58 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, pp. 964-67. 
59 Ibid., pp. 966-67; Perkins, pp. 218-21; also Zhang, ‘Ming Dynasty’, p. 7981; Liang, ‘Survey’; Shi, ‘Yields per Mu’, p. 
55; Zhao, ‘Technical Errors’. Note: 15 mu = 1 acre.  
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hesitation) some 50 years ago which was to define ‘a standard mu as equal to a tiny plot of land of 
1/15th or 1/16th of a hectare.’60  
 
We intend to scrutinize the plausibility of the Perkins’ solution when we discuss the multiplier 
selected by BGL to represent modal yields of arable land allocated to the production of food 
grains. Meanwhile we observe that agrarian historians of Imperial China continue to grapple with 
official statistics for taxed land which are distorted by textual errors, the inclusion of untaxed land, 
corruption and, above all, by the state’s endeavours to tax progressively by grading and recording 
the empire’s cultivated area in a unit for measurement that officially allowed for variations in the 
quality of the soil. To convert millions of mu recorded in that way for fiscal purposes requires local 
archives and complex manipulations of data that ceased to be collected after 1644 when the Qing 
regime decided to adopt its Ming predecessor’s ‘Fish-scale Land Tax Registration’ (yulin ce) despite 
the fact that Ming regulations covered less than half of the territory of a vastly expanded Qing 
empire.61 The Ming system was established in 1393 when that regime’s Treasury recorded a total 
of 850.7 million ‘mu’ of farmland as liable for taxation, compared to 387.5 million mu actually taxed 
in 1391. By 1426 the total area recorded as taxed was 412.5 million mu. Clearly imperial fiscal 
records display significant degrees of mismatch between taxable, taxed and cultivated land.62  
 
Perkins, with help from a prior exercise published by Fujita, manufactured another run of ‘most 
likely estimates’ of 370 million mu plus or minus 70 million standardized/shimu for circa 1400; 500 
million plus or minus 100 million shimu for circa 1600 and applied his subjective correction factor of 
20% to arrive at figures of 666 million shimu for 1661 and 950 million shimu for the 1770s. He also 
worked with an improbable assumption that between 1685 and 1851 the area of cultivated land 
measured in standardized shimu grew in line with the fiscal mu of taxed land.63 Apparently his 
primary sources do not refer to anything approximating to regular and systematic cadastral surveys, 
but seem to be based on nothing more accurate than often-unchecked statements made by local 
government representatives, with vested interests of their own.64  
 
Our reading of Perkins in conjunction with other agrarian histories of China leads us to conclude 
that no simple or secure method has been devised that might allow historians to measure the total 
 
60 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, p. 966. 
61 Rice paddies look like fish scales in a bird-eye map, hence the name; see Zhang, Ming Dynasty, ch. ‘Shihuo Zhi’. 
62 Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 8; Liang, ‘Survey’; Shi, ‘Yields per Mu’, p. 55; Zhao, ‘Technical Errors’. 
63 Perkins, Agricultural Development, pp. 127, 298. 
64 Sobel, ‘Principle-Agent Problem’. 
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area of the empire’s land cultivated with food grains between 1400 and 1840.65 Furthermore, this is 
also the case for the empire’s cropped area. Predictably and where ecological conditions were 
favourable as and when Chinese farmers confronted population pressures, they compensated for 
a ‘Malthusian’ decline in land labour ratios by producing more crops per year. According to 
Bozhong Li by the early 19th century farms in the Yangtze Delta had increased the ratio of cropped 
to cultivated area to an equivalent of 1.7 crops of rice per annum.66 That ratio varied across the 
empire to a degree that makes it virtually impossible to construct acceptable estimates for either 
the areas or the yields per mu of imperial farmland sown with food grains. 67  There seems, 
moreover, to be no secure basis for  ‘contention from Guo or BGL that’ doubling rent paid for 
access to arable land ‘provides a good measure of crop yields’.68 Needless to say historical evidence 
for farm rents is neither abundant nor anything but complex to interpret. Agrarian historians seem 
to agree that rents were in general levied on the first crop which implies that for most years of the 
Ming and early Qing rule, Chinese farmers operated under Malthusian pressures and incentives to 
maximize output from their diminishing access to arable land of high fecundity.69  
 
Finally, there are serious issues concerning the data on market prices for food upon which several 
estimates as well as the purchasing power parity rate of exchange for 1840 depend.70 For example, 
the heavily utilized monthly reports for grain prices only appeared as late as 1738. Their coverage 
was uneven across the empire and many never arrived in Beijing.71 
 
As historians who support the Kuznetsian injunction to quantify the quantifiable, we have read no 
publications that convince us that this injunction has been acceptably followed by a sequence of 
calibrations that have produced estimates for either the cultivated or cropped areas of arable land 
sown with food grains between 1400 and 1840.72 We also remain sceptical towards any estimates 
that ‘reflect subjective judgment rather than formal statistical criteria;’ particularly if they are 
published with an unsupported ‘error range’ which, for unspecified reasons, apparently progressed 
from ‘plus or minus 20% in 1400 to 5% by the late nineteenth century.’73  
 
 
65 Perkins, Agricultural Development, Appendix 13, pp. 226-36. 
66 Li, Agricultural Development. 
67 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Debate’. 
68 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, p. 967. 
69 Deng, Development versus Stagnation, chs 4-6; Elvin, Pattern; Chao, Man and Land; Li, Agricultural Development. 
70 E.g. Chan and Kraus, Mid-Qing; Li, ‘Integration’; Wang ‘Secular Trends’; Cheung, Price of Rice. 
71 Lu and Peng, ‘Grain Prices’; Yu, ‘Data Quality’. 
72 Perkins, Agricultural Development; Chao, Man and Land; Wang, ‘Secular Trends’; Guo, ‘Food Production’; Shi, ‘Yields 
per Mu’, and Agricultural Development; Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’. 
73 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, p. 967. 
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4.   Average Grain Yields per Standardized Mu of Farmed Land in Imperial China,    
1400-1850 
Our scepticism has been compounded by examining the basic data published by Perkins, Guo and 
Shi – data that BGL depended upon for the construction of estimates for weighted average yields 
of grains per standardized mu of farmland for Ming and Qing times.74 BGL refer to a database of 
900 recorded yields collected by Perkins.75 Perkins clearly had grave doubts about this particular 
sample because (with characteristic caution) he selected only 12 figures for yields to represent a 
range of ecological locations and three centuries of Ming and Qing agrarian history 1500-1800. 
They range from 250-520 catties of unhusked rice per standardized shimu.76 At his surmised 
wastage rate of 50% and with outlays on fertilizers asserted to be 15% of gross output, Perkins’ 
data can be recalibrated into a net surplus and transformed into kilocalories produced and 
consumed by a peasant household farming 10 shimu of land. Our calibrations suggest that the 
kilocalories of food grains available for consumption would have fallen below the subsistence 
needs of a typical peasant family for food security.77  
 
For the Ming period BGL also utilized data published by Guo who expressed dissatisfaction with 
Perkins’ figures and somehow resolved the problem of standardizing the fiscal mu for the empire 
from local records.78 For that purpose, Guo used a ‘sample’ of 37 rice areas in South China and 
eight localities in the North. He asserts that the fecundities of the areas of farmland covered by 
these sources and designated in fiscal units could be converted to a standardized mu by calibrations 
that are based upon his unverifiable suggestions that 10% of the farmed land covered by his sources 
consisted of land of low fecundity, 30% were of middling fecundity, 40% were of high fecundity 
and 20% were of the highest fecundity. Where Guo’s rates for the standardization of mu came 
from is neither transparently explained nor justified? Nevertheless, they allow Guo to claim 
between 1400 and 1620 modal imperial yields increased by 17% to reach 148 kilogrammes per 
mu.79 
 
Our examination of Guo’s data is included as an appendix attached to an online working paper 
for this article.80 We have noted above that Guo’s statistical evidence consists of a disparate scatter 
 
74 Perkins, Agricultural Development; Guo, ‘Food Production’; Shi, ‘Yields per Mu’, and Agricultural Development. 
75 Perkins, Agricultural Development, Appendix 1. 
76 Ibid., p. 315, Table G.2. 
77 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Debate’; and Deng and O’Brien, ‘Kuznetsian Paradigm’. 
78 Guo, ‘Food Production’. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Kuznetsian Paradigm’. 
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of years in the 16th and 17th centuries and it refers to a tiny and potentially unrepresentative fraction 
of the empire’s area cultivated with food grains. We now add that calibrations base on Guo’s data 
reveal that the surplus outputs/incomes available to typical peasant families farming 10 mu of land 
in the Ming Period, could not have produced the volume of kilocalories of food grains that they 
required for food security.81  
 
For the Qing period 1690-1850 BGL report that Shi’s calculations for averaged imperial yields 
made allowance for multiple cropping and (presumably?) for variations in the fecundity of the mu 
in order to construct a database for yields derived ‘from local sources for six bench-marked years, 
1661, 1685, 1724, 1766, 1812 and 1850’. Shi’s sources cover every province of the empire and 
ecological zones from north and south China as well as dry and paddy farming. His statistics 
suggest that imperial yields for grains continued to increase slightly from 154 kilogrammes per ‘mu’ 
for 1685 to a level of 178 kilogrammes per mu for 1812. Shi’s database of yields of grains per 
standardized mu of land is derived from local documents that record grain yields achieved on some 
3,000 farms located in a dozen or so provinces of the Qing empire. The ratios cited in his book 
refer to: farms of disparate sizes; to a range of scattered years surrounding six benchmarked years 
covering two centuries of time and to years that include seasons marked by potentially significant 
fluctuations attributable to variations in harvests. While Shi’s research represents a contribution to 
the agrarian history of the Qing empire, we are not convinced that the statistical evidence he 
collected and published could be utilized to estimate annual average imperial yields of the 
credibility required by BGL for the construction of benchmarked conjectures for imperial grain 
production. 
 
Furthermore, and as they appear in print, the methods used by Shi to construct a run of yield ratios 
could not be recognized as an acceptable way to proceed. Shi seems: (a) to have grouped aggregated 
and averaged records for yields recorded for farms by province in order to calculate 16 mean 
(arithmetical averages) of provincial yields; and (b) to have calibrated figures purporting to 
represent trends and fluctuations in averaged grain yields for the whole empire as the mean of 
those sixteen provincial means for 6 benchmarked years across the 189 years cited above. The 
arithmetical calculations deployed by Shi are unlikely to generate acceptable conjectures for levels, 
trends and fluctuations in China-wide grain yields required to calculate grain production for 1661-
1850. Table 1 quantifies potential margins of error in Shi’s estimates for the size of farms and grain 
yields. 
 
81 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Debate’, and ‘Kuznetsian Paradigm’. 
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Table 1. Margins of Error in Shi’s Estimates82 
 
 Landholding gap Yield gap Type I† Type II§ 
Ratio* 205.7:1 8.6:1 839.2:1 586.3:1 
 
Notes: Landholding in mu; grain yield in shi per mu. * Ratios between the highest and the lowest values used by Shi 
for China’s national averages. † Margin of errors in term of ‘weightable gap’ = the largest landholding • the highest 
yield level – the smallest landholding • the lowest yield level. § Margin of errors in term of ‘weightable mean’ = the 
largest landholding • the highest yield level + the smallest handhold • the lowest yield level • 1/2. Detail is provided 
in Appendix B of this working paper. 
Source: Shi, Development and Underdevelopment, pp. 179-318. 
 
Furthermore, in line with estimates published by Perkins and Guo, Shi’s numbers imply that the 
quantity of staple foodstuffs available to a typical peasant family cultivating, say, 10 mu of land 
could not (after payments for rent and fertilizers) have been sufficient to provide Chinese families, 
growing in size, with food security. In short, the micro-economic data in print for population 
growth as well as often statistical evidence about the standards of living of the peasantry in early 
Qing times are prima facie not consistent with Shi’s (or Guo’s) evidence for average yields.83 
 
We do not, moreover, find the solutions to the problems of multiple cropping and standardizing 
the mu adopted by Perkins, Guo or Shi to be either transparent or conclusive. Apparently, Perkins’ 
considered a mu of cultivable land to be equal to one fifteenth of a hectare, or one-sixth of an acre. 
This implies a majority of farms in the Qing empire could well have been too small to have 
provided food security for a majority of peasant families. Guo’s sample is also too small to be 
accepted as representative. His solution to the problem of converting fiscal mu into a standardized 
area of cultivated land could well be mere guesswork? 
 
While Shi is not transparent on how he constructed estimates for the empire’s area of cultivated 
land. We show in our working paper, that the ratios he published to represent average grain yields 
which purport to refer to the whole of the Qing empire are numbers that are all too likely to 
obscure extraordinary degrees of variance/deviation from year to year and location to location. 
On examination they can be represented as a ‘reduction’ of some 3,000 figures recorded for a 
disparate range of annual harvests, farm sizes and ecologically distinct locations into simple 
arithmetical means of the data he discovered for grain yields for farms located in sixteen provinces 
of the Qing Empire.84 
 
82 For detail, see Appendix B of this working paper. 
83 Chao, Man and Land; Li, Agricultural Development; Huang, Peasant Family. 
84 Shi, Development and Underdevelopment. 
20 
 
Finally, agrarian historians recognize that household incomes and consumption were 
supplemented by net returns from the production of textiles. According to Pomeranz, the 
domestic production of textiles boosted the consumption of peasant families in the Yangtze region 
to a level that was discernibly above the level of kilogrammes designated by the F.A.O. as necessary 
for food security. Bozhong Li’s data for the Jiangnan Delta support that position but Huang’s 
Malthusian interpretation appeals to BGL.85 Their interpretation rests, however, on a foundation 
of statistical evidence derived from data published by Perkins, Guo and Shi that purports to refer 
to averaged yields of food grains per standardized mu of land cultivated by the peasantries of Ming 
and Qing China. We do not accept the claim that these three scholars have or could produce 
plausible conjectures, let alone historical evidence that is firm enough to be a secure basis for the 
estimates (graphically displayed in Fig. 2 A, B and C of BGL’s article).86 The Qing empire’s area of 
cultivated land denominated in a standardized mu, multiplied by Shi’s estimates for yields of food 
grains for 6 benchmarked years from 1661 to 1850 cannot be accepted as ‘firm’ or even ‘good’ 
numbers.  
 
BGL’s estimates are ‘foundational’ for a Kuznetsian study in Historical National Accounting 
because several of the components or sub-sectors for primary, secondary and tertiary production 
are derived by way of more or less plausible but ‘subjective’ ratios, shares or coefficients, designed 
in their initial form by Perkins, to quantify trends in the levels of food grain production for the 
Ming and early Qing years of Chinese agrarian history. 87 
 
For example, ‘BGL assume that net value added from food processing’ grew in line with 
agricultural output and that textiles plus cloth consumption per capita can be linked (as Perkins 
suggested) to the production of food grains. Prima facie the ratios of the net outputs of both these 
sub-sectors to net output for primary production revealed by the estimates for 1840 in Table 3, 
could be understated. Agrarian historians suggest that by 1840 Chinese peasant households were 
allocating a substantial share of the labour time at their disposal to both these activities.88 We 
remain to be persuaded that their combined net value added augmented the incomes of the 
workforce engaged in farming and other forms of household production amounted to a mere 6% 
 
85  Li, Agricultural Development; Huang, Peasant Family; Pomeranz, Great Divergence; and Zhai, ‘Rural Economic 
Performance’. 
86 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, pp. 964-69. 
87 In his forthcoming paper in the Journal of Economic History, Peter Solar observes ‘that the estimates for Chinese GDP 
over the long term depend for over 92% on grain output and population’. 




of the net value added derived from primary production as a whole.89 Or (to take another puzzling 
estimate) that as late as 1840 commerce (transport, trade and finance) added so little value to the 
diversified range of organic and manufactured commodities produced by a huge empire that had 
for centuries been seriously engaged in intra-regional trade. 
 
 
5.   The Construction of Trends and the Comparison of Levels for GDP per Capita in a 
Single and Singular Numeraire. 
Our final critique of this ambitious and heuristic endeavour to provide ‘firm’ statistical evidence 
for a reinterpretation of Chinese economic history based on national accounts is concerned with 
the quantified results of exercises designed and conducted by BGL to compare ‘Chinese Economic 
Performance’ with Britain and other Western European economies in terms of 1990 International 
Dollars and/or in Sterling for 1840. The data methods and results of these exercises are displayed 
with clarity in Tables 4-8 and Figures 8 and 9 of their article. 
 
Table 4 provides a summary of the ratios utilized for the construction of a purchasing power parity 
rate of exchange between Chinese and British currencies for 1840. That particular rate has been 
selected because it converts the multiplicity of commodities and services produced and valued at 
domestic Chinese prices into an ‘equivalent’ range and quality of commodities and services 
produced and valued in British prices for that same year. In brief, the rate has been designed to 
answer a key question: what might China’s GDP for 1840 have been worth at British prices? 
 
The complexities and problems of constructing anything clear and close to the complete range of 
‘comparable’ goods and services produced and priced by modern organic and industrial economies 
has been intensively discussed among economists and statisticians funded by international 
organizations. They work collaboratively in teams in order to produce large and representative 
samples to cover the diverse range of outputs valued in two or more currencies for contemporary 
economies.90 Their recent round of discussions has revealed just how sensitive the results can be 
to the number, range, quality and prices for ‘equivalent’ commodities and services included in 
‘representative’ samples for particular years.91 The empirical difficulties (and costs) of conducting 
these exercises in order to compare levels and changes in the volumes of gross domestic products 
across two or more national economies are formidable. Furthermore, experts who have engaged 
 
89 Broadberry, et al., ‘Divergence’, p. 973. 
90 Bolt and van Zanden, ‘Maddison Project’. 
91 Deaton and Heston, ‘Understanding PPPs’. 
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with these programmes in the empirical economics and statistics of national accounts have 
demonstrated not only how sensitive purchasing power parities can be to biased sampling, but also 
how vulnerable these exchange rates are to changes over short spans of time in the composition 
and productivity of primary, secondary and tertiary forms of production.92  
 
Assumptions of the kind made by the late Angus Maddison that a purchasing power parity rate of 
exchange calibrated for China (under the auspices of the World Bank in international dollars for 
1990) could serve as a numeraire for cross-country comparisons over eighteen centuries of imperial 
rule are, we have suggested conceptually and statistically flawed. 93  Maddison’s assertion that 
income per capita for the base year 1 CE of the Han Dynasty could be defined as equal to the highly 
contentious figure published by economists at the World Bank to represent a universally valid 
poverty line denominated as 450 dollars of personal consumption of food, commodities and 
services purchasable at domestic prices that prevailed in the United States for 1990 is to say the 
least contestable and has been contested.94 With that ambiguous number in place, in two editions 
of a book in 1998 and 2008, Maddison published seven estimates for Imperial China’s GDP per 
capita for benchmarked years 1 CE, 1000, 1500, 1600, 1700, 1820 and 1850 based upon nothing 
other than extrapolated rates of growth that he somehow ‘intuited’ and interpolated from his 
reading of secondary literature on the economic history of the empire published in English.95  
 
All Maddison’s estimates are denominated in 1990 US dollars. They display no growth in GDP 
per capita for Ming or early Qing China between 1300 and 1850. Their denomination in 
international dollars ostensibly allows for immediate comparisons with other estimates for GDP 
per capita denominated in the same numeraire Their meaning as historical evidence is, however, 
hard to grasp?96 None of the numbers are based on anything approximating to the construction of 
estimates for the production, incomes or consumption derived from more or less reliable statistical 
sources that refer to these particular benchmarked years. The inferences that historians could 
conceivably draw from them (either as an explicanda representing long term trends in economic 
growth of Imperial China or as a measure of changes in the capacity of the Chinese economy to 
supply goods and services for the empires’ population over 1850 years of history from the Han to 
 
92 Feenstra, et al., ‘Production and Expenditures’; and Feenstra, et al., ‘Who Shrunk China?’ 
93 Feenstra, et al., ‘Who Shrunk China?’; Johnson, ‘Is Never Better’; Deng and O’Brien, ‘Maddison Was Wrong’. 
94 Stiglitz, Global Poverty. 
95 Maddison, Chinese Performance, 2nd Ed.; also see Ma and de Jong, ‘Unfolding the Turbulent Century’; Ma, et al., ‘Living 
standards’; van Zanden and Ma, ‘Maddison’. 
96 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Maddison Was Wrong’. 
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the Qing dynasties) is not clear. 97  Nor, prima facie, could these numbers provide quantified 
impressions of the capacities and productivity of the Chinese economy compared to other empires 
and polities operating during such a very long span of world history. 
 
Maddison’s book is, nevertheless, important to consider because it reveals there is no shortcut way 
of simultaneously measuring either the economic growth of China over eras of history, or the 
relative capacities of that economy to provide commodities and services for the population that 
are not predicated on the construction of reliable runs of national accounts for GDP expressed in 
current and constant prices, convertible at regular and relatively short intervals into ‘numeraires’ 
that are analogous to a modern international dollar. 98 In other words, historians who wish to 
engage in cross-country comparisons of GDPs for pre-modern times will ipso facto need to 
construct purchasing power parity rates of exchange that are applicable and expressed in a relevant 
numeraire for a specified period of history. These prerequisites for comparative economic history 
have been difficult to comply with for modern times when states can rely on more or less efficient 
statistical services to provide the data they need for fiscal extraction and economic governance.99 
National accounts are particularly hard to construct for early modern imperial polities with large 
populations and extensive territories. Furthermore, a currency analogous to the modern dollar 
could be difficult to discern for the centuries from 1400-1800?100  
 
BGL are to be commended for their endeavours to construct a purchasing power parity rate of 
exchange between sterling and Qing China’s official currency (the silver tael) to facilitate an exercise 
in bilateral comparisons between their estimates for the British and Chinese GDPs per capita that 
could refer to levels of productivity and welfare provided by two very different economies for their 
respectively small and huge populations for years surrounding 1840.101 
 
On subjecting their rate of exchange to scrutiny we find, however, that there are grounds for 
suggesting that the Chinese data they utilized for its construction may also be inadequate for the 
purpose that it was designed to facilitate? For example, the basket of goods selected and weighted 
to reflect the range of commodities and services produced (not consumed) in China and Britain 
includes only seven commodities and no services and does not begin to mirror the standards 
 
97 De Jong and van Ark, GDP Levels; Bolt and van Zanden, ‘Maddison Project’. 
98 Maddison, Economic Performance, 2nd Ed.; and Ma, et al., ‘Living standards’. 
99 Feenstra, et al., ‘Production and Expenditures’. 
100 Jerven and Duncan, ‘Revising GDP’. 
101 During the Ming-Qing Period, the term ‘tael’ for silver was never a uniform quantity in terms weight and purity 
which varied from time to time and from region to region; see Deng, ‘Foreign Silver’. 
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prescribed for modern exercises. Five of the commodities are foodstuffs and three (rice, sugar and 
tea) were not produced in Britain. The notes below table 4 in the article do not explain how 
averaged prices for seven supposedly comparable commodities have been calculated. For China’s 
extensive territory and less integrated markets, variance around the prices of almost any 
commodity was likely to have been greater than it was for the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the 
use of British weights to represent the relative significance of six of the seven commodities 
included in an exercise designed to represent the composition of the empire’s gross domestic 
‘product’ is to conflate coefficients required for conversions to a numeraire relevant for 
comparisons of production with an exchange rate required to measure relative levels of income 
and consumption.102  
 
Furthermore, the issue of the currency which has perplexed and frustrated generations of 
economic historians of pre-modern China, has not been addressed by BGL.103 Yet most monetized 
transactions within the Ming and Qing empires were conducted in copper wen – a metallic coin 
produced by no less than 40 mints that was neither standardized as copper of a certain weight and 
finesse, nor convertible across the empire at a single stable rate of exchange into silver taels.104 
Silver utilized by and for transactions with the state and for long distance wholesale trade served 
basically as the empire’s official unit of account. Its purchasing power depended not only on 
inflows of silver earned from net commodity exports, but also the form in which it was utilized 
for the purchase of goods, services and the settlement of debts. In their most acceptable and 
reliable form, namely, as Mexican dollars, grams of silver commanded a premium of up to 25% 
over bars, ingots and fragments. 105  Leading experts on the currency of Imperial China have 
concurred with King’s classical and quotable assessment that ‘in China every monetary transaction 
was to an extent an exchange transaction.’106 These complexities can neither be dismissed as 
insignificant for the interpretation of modal prices for commodities produced in China, nor can 
they be ignored for the calibration of the purchasing power parity of the tael’s exchange rate with 
sterling in circa 1840. Above all, they reveal historical and institutional contexts that may well make 
it impossible to discover and calibrate the statistics required to uncover a representative set of 
prices and weights necessary to construct the sequence of bilateral purchasing power parity rates 
 
102 Usher, Price Mechanism; Taylor and Tailor, ‘Purchasing Power’.  
103 Horesh, Chinese Money; Deng, ‘Foreign Silver’; Peng, ‘Prices’; Lu and Peng, ‘Grain Prices’; Yu, ‘Data Quality’; 
Kuroda, ‘Anonymous Currencies’; cf. Kishimoto, Prices and Economic Changes. 
104 Deng, ‘Foreign Silver’. 
105 Kuroda, ‘Anonymous Currencies’; Kuroda, Money. 
106 King, Money, p. 7. 
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of exchange required to compare the domestic product of Imperial China with any of the leading 
economies of Western Europe for pre-modern times.107  
 
This is unfortunate because theoretically plausible conjectures for gross domestic products per 
capita converted to a common numeraire for 1840 could conceivably serve to effectively 
undermined theses associated with the California School and the polemical writings of Gunder 
Frank that the economies of Imperial China and Western Europe had been on cultural, 
institutional, technological and economic trajectories with similar potential for the achievement of 
higher standards of living for their populations until late in the 18th century. We can all agree that 
rejections of Weberian and other Eurocentred interpretations of China’s economic history have 
been stimulating to discuss, but after two decades of debate, are considered to be both 
unquantifiable and improbable.108  
 
Unfortunately, the volume, range and quality of statistical evidence for Ming and Qing China for 
the period from 1400 to 1840 will not, in our view, turn out to be sufficient or accurate enough 
for the construction of plausible runs of estimates either for the empires’ GDP or for an historical 
sequence of reliable purchasing power parity exchange rates for the complex array of currencies 
utilized across the empire for centuries before and after the 1840s.109 
 
The estimates constructed by Stephen Broadberry and his Chinese co-authors are not, moreover, 
congruent with historiographical surveys of economic conditions recorded by European travellers 
to Ming and early Qing China.110 Nevertheless, prestige is attached to numbers and the clarity 
imparted by the graphical representation of unexamined statistics is often impressionable. They 
may persuade those who are not au fait with the complexities involved in constructing national 
accounts, index numbers and purchasing power parity rates of exchange to treat ostensibly 
quantified interpretations of Chinese history as acceptable history.111  
 
But could, for example, the differentials in average standards of living between the populations of 
early Qing China and Victorian Britain for the 1840s be realistically represented by the figures 
calibrated by BGL for Table 5? That table summarizes and conveys statistical evidence that 
suggests by 1840 a majority of the population of Qing China were subsisting in an economy that 
 
107 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Standards of Living’. 
108 Roy and Riello, Global Economic History, O’Brien, Economies; Frank, ReOrient. 
109 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Maddison Was Wrong’. 
110 Jones, Image of China. 
111 Phillipsen, Little Big Numbers. 
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provided them with levels of income and consumption that could be represented as equivalent to 
roughly a quarter (23.76%) of contemporaneous British levels. How plausible are numerical 
impressions that lays claim to a differential of 4 to 1 in labour productivity that had emerged 
between these two economies as early as 1840? If they are correct or even conceivable, they 
certainly support traditional views that smaller scale national economies like Britain (with a GDP 
that amounted to a mere 20% and a population that was only 5% of the totals recorded for Qing 
China) were likely to have been on far more sustainable trajectories for earlier transitions to 
modern economic growth. But is the estimated per capita income for early Qing China anything 
more than another set of manufactured numbers that could not for reasons elaborated here, 
undermine the more cautious claims of the California School? In essence, the School’s revisionism 
can continue to be read as a reasonable rejection of Eurocentred views that the long-run economic 
development of Imperial China could be written as a history of long-term retardation compared 
with the West? 
 
BGL’s exercise in Historical National Accounting is the most recent and sophisticated attempt to 
mobilize what they claim as ‘firm’ statistical evidence that restores interpretations that have 
stimulated two decades of heuristic debates on the Great Divergence. Our thesis (to repeat) is that 
the primary sources available for the Ming and early Qing China are not good enough to support 
Kuznetsian forms of economic history for early modern Asian empires. Furthermore, we wish to 
observe that BGL’s estimates for Chinese GDP per capita in 1840 not only could not (but even as 
they stand, do not) undermine positions taken in the California School in the divergence debate. 
 
For example, their estimate of 13.5 silver taels as a ‘median’ figure for GDP per capita for Qing 
China for the decade around 1840 can be transformed (using their published average price for a 
kilogramme of ‘edible rice’) into a number expressed in modern kilocalories that ‘suggests’ that the 
early Qing economy while (undergoing accelerated rates of demographic growth) retained the 
capacity to provide nutrition for the majority of the Chinese population at a level of consumption 
(measured kilocalories per capita per day) that was discernibly above the levels prescribed in our 
own times for ‘food security’.112 Furthermore, if our calibrations for the nutritional standards of 
living provided by the wages of labourers employed in agriculture and urban construction in 
England between 1800-49 are more or less correct, they seem according to statistical evidence 
 
112 As far as one can tell, prior to the 1890s there were as many as 56 regional silver weight standards and 2 national 
silver weight standards for a tael; see Deng, ‘Foreign Silver’. Thus, any tael figure arouses legitimate scepticism.  
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published by BGL to be on a par with those afflicting most Chinese peasant families around that 
time.113  
 
There are, moreover, significant definitional and conceptual problems surrounding the conversion 
of 13.05 silver taels into ratios that they formulated to bring not only British but also global 
perspectives to bear on this new estimate for GDP per capita for circa 1840. This bilateral 
comparison transforms 13.05 silver taels with a contestable purchasing power parity ratio for 
exchange of £6.43 into an equivalent per capita sum in sterling that was certainly way below the 
income required to buy food security in Victorian Britain. And unless China’s domestic 
consumption included a high proportion of British commodities and services it is difficult to 
conceive of the sense in which these estimates in sterling are a revealing way of comparing the 
welfare of the population of early Qing China with the population of Victorian Britons. The latter 
may or may not have been reassured to learn that the kingdom’s economy was providing them 
with modal real incomes that could be represented as superior to Chinese ‘real’ incomes by a factor 
of around four. 
 
BGL seem to be as keen as the late Angus Maddison to locate the economy of Imperial China in 
league tables of medieval and pre-industrial national economies. To do that they have, however, 
implicitly adopted his conceptually flawed methodology by expressing Chinese GDP per capita 
for circa 1840 in single and singular numeraire (namely international dollars for 1990. Furthermore 
(and by way of backward projection in rates of growth that are neither transparent, explained nor 
validated) they extended the number for 1840 all the way back to 980. As we elaborated above, a 
numeraire denominated in international dollars for years around 1990 was designed to render 
domestic national products of the world’s economies published for that year and surrounding years 
in current domestic prices and currencies comparable across space and for circumscribed spans of 
history. 
 
The meaning and limitations of BGL’s numeraire as an index for the measurement of temporal as 
well as cross-country variations in levels of GDP and GDP per capita have been rigorously 
analysed in recent debates among economists, responding to pronounced discontinuities in the 
size and rankings of major national economies that appeared in mercantilist league tables, 
published by international organizations. 114  The discontinuities are now attributed to 
 
113 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Debate’. 
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improvements to collaborative international endeavours to measure the purchasing power parities 
of national currencies for decades after 1990. In the light of this discussion we concluded 
Maddison’s estimates for the per capita GDP of China denominated in 1990 international dollars 
which claim to refer to trends covering nearly two thousand years of imperial history might now 
be regarded as a provocative but conceptually ambiguous index, either for the simultaneous 
measurement for the empires’ long-run rate of economic growth or for reliable statistically based 
impressions of its relative levels of economic development compared either to western European 
polities or other Asian empires.115  
 
Another way of expressing this point is to consider the methods that BGL derived from Maddison 
to facilitate the conversion of their estimates for the nominal values of GDP per capita for Britain 
(£27.07) and China (13.05 taels) for circa 1840 into a numeraire that would allow for multilateral 
comparisons. Unfortunately the potential range of multilateral comparisons for that period in 
global history is restricted to a tiny range of national economies for which more or less reliable 
estimates for nominal GDP per capita happened to be available; along with the price and 
quantifiable data required to convert representative samples of domestically produced 
commodities and services, denominated in domestic prices and currencies into a currency that was 
universally used for that period for international transactions. For years circa 1840 that currency 
was more likely to be grams of silver or sterling than American dollars. Bilaterally the silver rate of 
exchange cited by BGL leads, however, to a hypothesis that British GDP per capita circa 1840 was 
already nearly seven times higher than the level prevailing in Qing China? Purchasing power parity 
rates of exchange for circa 1840 are most unlikely to be comparable to the rates calibrated in dollars 
to refer to a much larger sample of national economies for modern years circa 1990 or even for 
years after that period.116  
 
Backward extrapolations over centuries of time from 1990 to year 1 CE (pace Maddison) or from 
1840 to 1400 or to 980 (pace BGL) are heuristic numerical abstractions for economic historians 
to consider and debate. Nevertheless, in our view they seem to have raised rather than settled 
problems for a branch of the subject that laudably aspires to be transnational, reciprocally 
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Appendix A: Review of the Legacy Left by Chung-li Chang (or Zhang Zhongli)  
 
Chang (or Zhang) has indeed left a legacy with which historical estimation has flourished. The 
problem however is that estimators cannot settle their differences. As a result, re-estimation is 
common in a completely open-ended fashion.  
 
In addition, Chang’s methodology nurtures ignorance, rather than enlightenment, of a range of 
defects and problems with quantitative information extracted from China’s historical records.117 
We single out twelve areas as examples in Table A.  
 
Table A. Summary of Defects in Information Available in China’s Historical Records 
 
Category Defect/problem 
(1) Agricultural yield Four: (1) Land outputs were highly local and seasonal. The differences 
across villages in the same region were as great as those between mag-
regions. In addition, yields were determined by labour skills/inputs as well 
as at the mercy of the mother nature. So, margins of error for calculating 
an average yield level are often intolerable. (2) The Chinese tradition paid 
most attention to good and, especially, exceptional yields as an omen of a 
good fortune. Thus, high yields appear disproportionately in Chinese 
written records. This bias was exposed when land surveys in the 1920s 
and 30s came along. (3) Moreover, estimates have so far been based on a 
50-50 share-cropping split between the landlord and tenant, overlooking 
the entire output from the second crop (called the winter crop) which was 
completely rent free. In addition, it is questionable whether the 50-50 split 
was universal. (4) Finally, all estimates have been made on a disaster-free 
assumption. No study has so far factored in natural disasters which 
affected a third of the empire per annum.  
(2) Archives One: Since the Western Han Period (206 BC – 24 AD), it was a common 
practice for the descendant dynasty to compile the official history of its 
predecessor. To avoid future controversy, the descendant dynasty was 
obliged to destroy its predecessor’s official archives after the official 
history was completed, the Qing Period (1644-1911) being the exception 
due to the fact that no official history has been compiled.  
(3) Currencies Four: (1) Scale and scope of the adoption and use of imported 
heterogeneous silver coins and the loose notion of the ‘Chinese silver tael’. 
(2) Copper (actually bronze) currencies were the legal tender but not 
unified. No single benchmark for the whole empire was available at any 
given time. Regional differences were very common in sizes and shapes 
as well as alloys. (3) Debasement took place often. (4) Counterfeits, up to 
40 percent of the money in circulation, were widespread and perpetual. 
 
117 Our observation resonates the breathtaking critique made by Professor Richard von Glahn of UCLA in 24 April 
2019 at Peking University. He was quoted to state that ‘In recent years much research into and analysis of quantitative 
history has often been based on fragmented historical data collected from Chinese literature. One big problem though 
is that European scholars lack both the basic knowledge of and a rational structure for China’s economic history, and 
therefore are unable to evaluate the quality of the quantitative materials that they use.’ (近年来的许多量化历史研
究往往基于中国文献中支离破碎的历史数据进行比较分析，其中一个很大的问题是欧洲学者对中国经济
史 缺 乏 基 本 常 识 和 理 念 框 架 ， 因 而 也 无 法 评 估 所 用 量 化 资 料 的 质 量 .)Vide 




(4) Farmland Three: (1) On the macro-level, cadastral surveys were always regional. 
True empire-wide cadastral surveys were non-existent. (2) On the micro-
level, the land measurement unit mu varied from time to time and from 
place to place. (3) There was a common use of the ‘fiscal mu’ for collecting 
taxes. Although on government accounting records, the fiscal mu did not 
reflect the real farmland under real crops.  
(5) Food prices Three: (1) Officially reported foods prices were overwhelmingly urban. 
But the urban population was insignificant. So, such prices only affected 
a tiny market. (2) The urban food market was interfered by the state food 
procurement and discharge policies via a granary network at all levels: 
counties, prefectures and provinces. Thus, there was no real ‘market 
prices’ for staple food. (3) There was false sense of food price integration 
across the empire largely due to the same government interference. 
(6) GDP Three: (1) There was no reliable way to convert value or volume. (2) There 
was no single regional or national survey for the weight of each sector in 
the economy in terms of inputs, outputs, imports and exports. (3) Written 
records on industrial and service activities were anecdotal, sporadic and 
patchy. 
(7) Living standards Two: (1) There was no survey of living standards before the 1920s. (2) All 
estimates have so far been made according to ‘Malthusian subsistence’ 
which conceptually permits no population growth which contradicts pre-
modern China’s demography.  
(8) Population Two: (1) No regular population censuses were conducted. (2) No head-
count of all residents. Instead, population numbers were exclusively for 
male tax-payers (ding) aged 16 to 60.  
(9) Silver Five: (1) Silver was in wide circulation since circa 1565 AD but not 
recognised as legal tender until the 1890s. (2) Silver was overwhelmingly 
imported by the private sector without records. (3) Silver weight tael varied 
from place to place. Also, tael did not specify the silver content which 
varied from 50 to 70 percent among imported species. (4) The ‘copper-
silver exchange rates’ were highly local and customary. (5) Tael was also a 
‘phantom unit’ with which actual transactions were often conducted 
without silver at all.  
(10) Taxes Two: (1) With the 1712 Decree to freeze the Qing land-poll tax revenue, 
the Qing tax was dis-connected from the size of China’s population and 
farming acreage. (2) Until 1850, all rural exchanges, the backbone of 
China’s market, were tax-free.  
(11) Time series One: There was no coherent and consistent set of spatial and temporal 
data whereby a time series can be constructed.  
(12) Wages Two: (1) The number of full-time wage-dependant workers in China’s 
traditional economy was trivial (no more than one percent of China’s total 
workforce). (2) Wages were always paid in a combination of cash and 
goods (food, shelter and clothing). The latter type was often hidden.  
 
Sources: (1) Agricultural yields - Kent Deng and Patrick O’Brien, ‘Nutritional Standards of Living in England and the 
Yangtze Delta (Jiangnan), c.1644 – c.1840’, The Journal of World History, 26/2 (2015), pp. 233-67; Kent Deng and Patrick 
O’Brien, ‘China’s GDP per Capita from the Han Dynasty to Communist Times’, World Economics Journal, 17/2 (2016), 
pp. 79-123. (2) Archives - Luca Zan and Kent Deng, ‘Micro Foundations in the Great Divergence Debate: Opening 
up the Perspective’, Accounting History, 22/4 (2017), pp. 530-53. (3) Currencies - Kent Deng, ‘Miracle or Mirage? 
Foreign Silver, China’s Economy and Globalisation of the Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries’, Pacific Economic Review, 
13/3 (2008), pp. 320-57. (4) Farmland - Kent Deng and Patrick O’Brien, ‘China’s GDP per Capita from the Han 
Dynasty to Communist Times’, World Economics Journal, 17/2 (2016), pp. 79-123. (5) Food prices - Kent Deng and 
Shengmin Sun, ‘China’s Extraordinary Population Expansion and Its Determinants during the Qing Period, 1644-
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1911’, Population Review, 58/1 (2019), pp. 20-78. (6) GDP - Kent Deng and Patrick O’Brien, ‘China’s GDP per Capita 
from the Han Dynasty to Communist Times’, World Economics Journal, 17/2 (2016), pp. 79-123. (7) Living standards - 
Kent Deng and Patrick O’Brien, ‘Nutritional Standards of Living in England and the Yangtze Delta (Jiangnan), c.1644 
– c.1840’, The Journal of World History, 26/2 (2015), pp. 233-67. (8) Population - Kent Deng, ‘Unveiling China’s True 
Population Statistics for the Pre-Modern Era with Official Census Data’, Population Review, 43/2 (2004), pp. 1-38. (9) 
Silver currency - Kent Deng, ‘Miracle or Mirage? Foreign Silver, China’s Economy and Globalisation of the Sixteenth 
to Nineteenth Centuries’, Pacific Economic Review, 13/3 (2008), pp. 320-57. (10) Taxes - Kent Deng, China’s Political 
Economy in Modern Times: Changes and Economic Consequences, 1800–2000 (London, 2011), pp. 16-18, 34, 59. (11) Time 
series - Kent Deng and Patrick O’Brien, ‘Establishing Statistical Foundations of a Chronology for the Great 
Divergence’, Economic History Review, 69/4 (2016), pp. 1057-82. (12) Wages - Kent Deng and Patrick O’Brien, 






Appendix B: Detailed Margins of Error in Shi’s Estimates  
Table B demonstrate problems with Shi’s simple arithmetic averages. Firstly, the landholding ratios 
between the large and small farms on are huge (on average 205.7 to 1); and so are land yield ratios 
between the higher and lower ends (on average 8.6 to 1). If so, it is inappropriate to take simple 
arithmetic averages from such yield figures. Rather, it is sensible to factor in the size of farms. 
Secondly, arithmetic averages create huge margins of error measured by either the gap between 
the weighted highest and lowest farming acreages (839.2 to 1) or the mean value between the 
weighted highest and lowest farming acreages (586.3 to 1). These numbers look ridiculous. Given 
that Shi’s entire matrix of GDP estimates is based on his estimates for the farming, the same 
margins of error are inevitably passed on to his estimates for the Qing GDP. 
 
Table B. Shi’s Data for Landholding Sizes (Mu) and Grain Yield Levels (Shi per Mu) 
 
Region Landholding ratio* Yield ratio* Maximal interval† Gap‡ Mean§ 
Zhili 50.0 12.1 91; 1.5 89.5 46.3 
 8.2 8.8 7.2; 0.8 6.4 4.0 
 8.3 10.0 8.3; 0.8 7.5 4.6 
 229.5 10.0 229.5; 23.0 206.5 126.3 
Shandong 2.2 9.5 6.6; 0.9 5.7 3.9 
 46.6 10.8 151.5; 14.0 137.5 82.8 
 1.1 10.0 1.0; 0.1 0.9 0.6 
 73.4 30.0 220.2; 7.3 212.9 113.8 
Henan 8.0 5.8 7.0; 1.2 5.8 4.1 
 27.2 5.5 32.6; 6.0 26.6 19.3 
 361.0 15.0 1083.0; 72.2 1010.8 577.6 
 273.0 21.9 835.4; 38.2 797.2 436.8 
Shanxi 1041.8 13.3 1385.6; 104.2 1281.4 744.9 
 19.5 53.5 20.9; 0.4 20.5 10.7 
 38.3 12.5 38.3; 3.1 35.2 20.7 
Shaanxi 86.3 40.0 138.1; 3.5 134.6 70.8 
 535.7 13.3 2142.8; 160.7 1982.1 1151.8 
 141.0 15.5 479.4; 31.0 448.4 255.2 
 103.0 10.0 124.6; 12.4 112.2 68.5 
 226.7 6.8 557.7; 81.6 476.1 319.7 
 20.5 30.0 30.8; 1.0 29.8 15.9 
Gansu 6.8 3.9 1.8; 0.5 1.3 1.1 
 94.0 15.7 162.6; 10.3 152.3 86.5 
 254.6 13.6 277.5; 20.4 257.1 149.0 
 462.2 34.1 1261.8; 37.0 1224.8 649.4 
 2.1 7.5 3.6; 0.5 3.1 2.1 
Manchuria 1.5 4.1 2.5; 0.6 1.9 1.6 
 2541.3 7.1 2338.0; 330.4 2007.6 1334.2 
Jiangsu 1.7 4.9 32.0; 3.0 29.0 17.5 
 50.0 8.6 275.0; 32.0 243.0 153.5 
 6.7 6.7 44.8; 6.7 38.1 25.8 
 3.0 8.2 21.0; 2.6 18.4 11.8 
 256.0 3.9 1843.2; 471.0 1372.2 1157.1 
 222.5 4.5 667.5; 149.1 518.4 408.3 
 84.7 4.6 338.8; 73.7 265.1 206.3 
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 280.0 5.5 1960.0; 358.4 1601.6 1159.2 
 626.7 5.3 4455.8; 839.8 3616.0 2647.8 
 76.8 4.0 345.6; 86.8 258.8 216.2 
 49.5 6.0 239.1; 39.6 199.5 139.4 
Zhejiang 38.3 6.0 229.8; 38.8 191.0 134.3 
 630.0 2.2 4202.1; 1953.0 2249.1 3077.6 
 112.0 6.5 1456.0; 224.0 1232.0 840.0 
 22.2 12.6 444.0; 35.3 408.7 239.7 
 92.0 4.5 693.7; 153.6 540.1 423.7 
 683.8 3.6 3897.7; 1094.1 2803.6 3350.7 
Fujian 1.9 2.7 12.7; 4.6 8.1 8.7 
 14.3 3.1 79.1; 25.7 53.4 52.4 
 68.5 2.2 342.5; 154.1 188.4 265.4 
 182.9 7.0 2397.8; 340.2 2057.6 1369.0 
 10.0 3.8 63.4; 16.7 46.7 40.1 
 35.8 5.2 307.9; 59.4 248.5 183.7 
 93.8 2.8 405.2; 144.5 260.7 274.9 
 150.0 8.0 1204.5; 150.0 1054.5 677.3 
Jiangxi 146.3 3.0 823.7; 270.7 553.0 547.2 
 228.2 5.1 912.8; 180.3 732.5 546.6 
 51.8 4.7 212.4; 45.6 166.8 129.0 
 149.3 2.6 718.1; 273.2 444.9 495.7 
 49.2 2.7 283.4; 103.3 180.1 193.4 
 376.7 3.0 2154.7; 719.5 1435.2 1437.1 
 45.5 2.5 225.7; 91.0 134.7 158.4 
 72.0 2.4 344.9; 144.0 200.9 244.5 
 140.8 5.2 995.5; 190.1 805.4 592.8 
 20.0 2.6 100.0; 38.0 62.0 69.0 
Guangdong 62.5 3.7 531.3; 144.4 386.9 337.9 
 51.5 4.8 386.3; 80.3 306.0 233.3 
 146.0 3.7 1068.7; 289.1 779.6 678.9 
 300.0 7.8 2433.0; 312.0 2121 1372.5 
 122.0 7.2 1342.0; 185.4 1156.6 763.7 
 117.8 5.1 1178.0; 229.7 948.3 703.9 
 23.9 9.4 173.0; 18.4 154.6 95.7 
 84.7 4.1 425.2; 104.2 321.0 264.7 
 54.0 3.6 374.8; 103.7 271.1 239.3 
 83.4 13.5 744.8; 55.0 689.8 399.9 
 290.0 5.2 1824.1; 353.8 1470.3 1089.0 
 143.7 5.8 469.9; 80.5 389.4 275.2 
 217.1 7.8 1302.6; 167.2 1135.4 734.9 
 121.0 6.5 588.1; 90.8 497.3 339.5 
 20.4 9.8 130.6; 13.3 117.3 72.0 
 83.1 17.6 554.3; 31.6 522.7 293.0 
 23.9 8.9 99.4; 11.2 88.2 55.3 
 3.2 3.1 12.3; 4.0 8.3 8.2 
Hubei 9.8 3.0 23.3; 7.8 15.5 15.6 
 14.1 4.9 69.5; 14.1 55.4 41.8 
 5.8 5.8 23.2; 4.0 19.2 13.6 
 2.0 2.2 4.7; 2.1 2.6 3.4 
 3.2 6.5 196.8; 3.0 193.8 99.9 
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 7.0 4.7 28.0; 6.0 22.0 17.0 
 47.1 4.4 165.8; 37.7 128.1 101.8 
 23.5 5.5 129.3; 23.5 105.8 76.4 
 6.2 6.7 24.5; 3.7 20.8 14.1 
 33.8 5.2 202.8; 38.9 163.9 120.9 
 197.0 7.3 1438.1; 197.0 1241.1 817.6 
 99.2 2.0 398.8; 198.4 200.4 298.6 
 238.8 2.1 1511.6; 709.2 802.4 1104.9 
 26.5 3.2 159.0; 50.1 108.9 104.6 
 131.0 7.4 969.4; 131.0 838.4 550.2 
 357.8 3.2 1789.0; 558.2 1230.8 1173.6 
 115.4 3.0 480.1; 158.1 322.0 319.1 
 75.0 4.2 514.5; 123.0 391.5 318.8 
 133.3 2.9 799.8; 274.6 525.2 537.2 
 133.3 4.9 751.8; 153.3 598.5 452.6 
Sichuan 41.0 1.8 221.4; 123.0 98.4 172.2 
 69.9 3.1 529.1; 168.5 360.6 348.8 
 20.0 8.0 128.0; 16.0 112.0 72.0 
 1046.3 8.5 10034.0; 1182.3 8851.7 5608.1 
 12.7 4.4 68.8; 15.6 53.2 42.2 
 12.2 4.6 55.8; 12.1 43.7 34.0 
 162.9 8.6 2225.2; 257.4 1967.8 1241.3 
 113.0 6.8 339.0; 49.7 289.3 194.3 
 210.0 3.2 1068.9; 329.7 739.2 699.3 
 131.5 7.0 854.8; 122.3 732.5 488.6 
 301.8 7.0 2109.6; 301.8 1807.8 1205.7 
Yunnan 84.8 6.8 550.4; 80.6 469.8 315.5 
 68.0 16.8 1224.0; 72.8 1151.2 648.4 
 95.0 12.1 598.5; 49.4 549.1 324.0 
 144.8 4.2 580.6; 137.6 443.0 359.1 
 180.5 21.0 1397.1; 66.8 1330.3 732.0 
 152.8 23.7 941.2; 39.7 901.5 490.4 
 6660.0 12.1 26640.0; 2197.8 24442.2 14418.9 
 600.0 14.6 4200.0; 288.0 3912.0 2244.0 
 46.4 17.8 329.4; 18.6 310.8 174.0 
 202.5 29.0 1233.2; 42.5 1190.7 637.9 
Guizhou 128.0 6.6 960.0; 146.0 814.0 553.0 
 77.3 9.8 470.0; 47.9 422.1 259.0 
 189.0 30.4 2296.4; 75.6 2220.8 1186.0 
 26.7 8.3 133.5; 16.0 117.5 74.7 
Total 26121.8 1089.4 - 106575 74458.3 
Overall average 205.7 8.6 - 839.2 586.3 
 
Notes: The grouping of the 127 sets of numbers comes from Shi’s own method. * Ratios between the highest and 
the lowest values extracted by Shi from historical writings on different locations and times during the Qing rule (1644-
1911). † Maximal interval = between the largest landholding • the highest yield level versus the smallest handhold • 
the lowest yield level. ‡ Gap = the largest landholding • the highest yield level – the smallest handhold • the lowest 
yield level. § Mean value = the largest landholding • the highest yield level + the smallest handhold • the lowest yield 
level • 1/2. 
Source: Shi, Development and Underdevelopment, pp. 179-318. 
 
